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I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Reserve took on an expanded role as lender-of-last-resort in attempting to moderate the financial crisis of 2008-09 and the recession that followed.
1 It has, nevertheless, been criticized for not preventing the risky behavior of large financial companies prior to the crisis, for approving their mergers that aggravated the "too-big-to-fail" problem, and for its substantial contribution to bail-outs when their risk management failed. As might be expected, the DoddFrank Act of 2010 contains provisions that appear to limit the Federal Reserve System's (Fed's)
autonomy.
2 Among other things, it has folded the Fed into a new, overarching regulatory agency, restricted its functioning as a lender-of-last resort, subsumed its judgments to that of the Treasury in important credit extension matters, augmented Government Accountability Office (GAO) review to fortify congressional oversight, modified Reserve Bank governance to enhance the dominance of the presidentially-appointed Board of Governors, and added a "systemic risk"
factor to the Board's prior assessment of large bank mergers.
At the same time, Dodd-Frank has also extended the Fed's supervisory authority and expanded its capacity to exercise control over the behavior of those it regulates. This growth in authority is in addition to other changes in monetary powers over the past several years that have augmented its power and influence.
This paper reviews and evaluates constraints imposed on Federal Reserve autonomy by Dodd-Frank, and also the expansion of its authority, both by the law and in other ways. It finds that the constraints are not likely to be significant, but that the augmentation of authority is. It is more the augmentation than the constraints that invites questions about the Fed's autonomy.
II. THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF FEDERAL RESERVE AUTONOMY
Central banking practices in Europe in the latter part of the 19 th and early 20 th centuries were aimed at protecting gold reserves through interest rate adjustments and, when necessary, providing emergency assistance in financial crises. In general, central banks operated without 1 See Bernanke, 2012 . Hyman Minsky, observing changes in financial markets and instruments over forty years ago, anticipated the need for the expansion of lender-of-last resort responsibilities. See, for example, Minksy, 1969, pp. 189-90. 2 Relevant provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act are often separately applicable to the Board of Governors and the Reserve Banks. Nevertheless, except where necessary the term "Federal Reserve" or "Fed" is used without specific reference to the former or latter. See Volker, 1986, p. 186 and McDonough, 1994, p. 5. 8 For additional discussion of Federal Reserve independence, and a review of these issues, see Shull, 1995-96. 9 Between 1980 and 2009, the deposits held by the five largest commercial banks in the U.S. increased from about 12 percent to 43 percent. For information on the growth of the largest banking companies through mergers and acquisitions, see Shull, 2010, Appendix A. 10 In the late 1980s, Treasury officials, as well as Alan Greenspan, supported the creation of so-called "superbanks" that could better compete with Japanese and European banking companies. See Nash, 1989. opposed such proposals, arguing that regulatory authority is critical to its monetary policy 
III. DODD-FRANK PROVISIONS
As noted, a number of Dodd-Frank Act provisions impose constraints on the Fed; others augment its authority. They are reviewed below.
A. New Supervisory Framework
The law The Fed continues as the supervisor of bank holding companies, with strengthened authority over their bank and nonbank subsidiaries. 14 It has also been given authority over savings and loan holding companies, transferred from the now defunct Office of Thrift 11 See Board of Governors, 1984, p. 547. 12 Ibid., pp. 548-49.
7
Supervision. 15 On the recognition that the financial crisis emanated, in part, from the risky activities of investment banks and insurance companies, the Fed is also charged with supervising nonbank financial institutions designated as systematically important (SIFIs) by the FSOC. All bank holding companies with over $50 billion assets are also classified as systemically important.
16
The Fed is required to impose "enhanced prudential standards" on the SIFIs it supervises, including higher capital, leverage and liquidity requirements, albeit subject to recommendations by the FSOC. In addition, all SIFIs must develop "orderly resolution" plans ('living wills'). 17 These are intended to permit their liquidation without systemic impact. 18 A former chairperson of the FDIC, Sheila Blair, has stated that the Fed and the FDIC may need to require organizational changes that "rationalize" large banking company structures because "...there is a real danger that their complexity could make a SIFI resolution far more costly and more difficult than it needs to be."
19
If the Fed and the FDIC jointly determine that a company's resolution plan is not credible, the Fed is authorized to impose still more stringent balance sheet requirements and also to restrict growth and/or specific activities. If a company does not submit a credible resolution plan within two years after these measures have been imposed, the Fed may determine that it 'poses a grave threat to financial stability.' On a two-thirds vote of the FSOC, it can restrict on 8 mergers, acquisitions, specific financial products offered by the offending company, and require it to terminate activities and to sell assets; i.e., to divest.
20

B. Emergency Lending, GAO Audits, and Reserve Bank Directors
The new law imposes additional constraints on the extension of credit in emergencies to nonbanks, audits by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the selection of Reserve
Bank presidents by their boards of directors. 21
Credit Extension in Exigent Circumstances
The Fed's authority to extend emergency credit to nonbanks [Section 13(3)] has been modified to prohibit it from targeting specific nonbank companies for rescue, as it did in the course of the financial crisis with AIG. Dodd-Frank permits it to provide credit to "individuals, partnerships
and corporations" (IPCs), in "unusual and exigent circumstances" within a "facility or program with broad-based eligibility." The Fed must have Treasury approval to establish such programs, must consult with the Treasury as to policies and procedures, and must provide reports to Congress.
GAO Audit and Other Information
The Federal Banking Agency Audit Act (1978) gave the GAO authority to audit the Fed and for the public release of information. 
C. New Merger Restrictions
In approving mergers and acquisitions, the Fed must now consider the risk posed by any combination to the stability of the U.S. banking or financial system. 24 The law also prohibits mergers and acquisitions of financial companies that would bring the resulting firm's consolidated liabilities to more than 10 percent of the aggregate consolidated liabilities of all financial companies nationwide. 25 A previous 10 percent limit had applied only to banking companies and deposits of insured depository institutions. It had invited circumvention through the acquisition of firms with non-deposit liabilities. Rather, it organized a private lending consortium to prevent the collapse.
26
IV. EXPANDED AUTHORITY AND CONSTRAINTS
28
The effectiveness of the constraint on extensions of credit by the Fed to nonbanks in exigent circumstances is similarly tenuous. It is plausible that the Fed could find ways around 27 Hurst, 1982, pp. 40, 41. 28 On the Fed's involvement with LTCM, see Lowenstein, 2000, pp. 194 ff. On the role of consortiums in notable crises of the past, see Shull, 2005, pp. 29-35 and pp. 38-39. the limitation as it did in the case of LTCM. But such circumvention might not normally be necessary. The Fed's recommendations are likely to be sufficient for the Treasury and the FSOC to conclude that the failure of one or more nonbanking companies poses a systemic threat and requires intervention.
29
For some time, the Fed has maintained that GAO audits of monetary policy deliberations and determinations would expose its policy decisions to political pressure. There are a number in Congress who, nevertheless, believes that extended GAO audits are necessary. This varied experience might possibly provide evidence on the impact of GAO audits on the Fed's monetary policy independence. To date, the issue is beset by conflicting opinions and unsupported speculation.
The new voting arrangement for Reserve Bank presidents appears to shift power from member banks to the Board (which will now select half of the voting directors rather than onethird). However, since the Banking Act of 1935, the appointment of Reserve Bank presidents and first vice presidents has been subject to approval by the Board of Governors.
31
There are anecdotal suggestions that the Board has exercised its authority, but no publicly available information on the extent to which this has been the case or for what reasons. 29 The government has, in crises and difficult economic times, been assertive in having the Fed make such loans. Congress initially provided authority to the Fed for loans to nonbanks in the Emergency Relief and Construction Act of July 1932, and further elaborated the authority in the Emergency Banking Act of March, 1933 and the Industrial Advances Act of June, 1934. It did not revoke the authority until 1958, and then on the view that it was no longer necessary. It restored the authority in the wake of the S&L debacle and commercial bank real estate problems on passing FDICIA in 1991. In any event, the Board's authority to reject selections is likely to be effective in shaping
Reserve Bank elections. The new voting restriction appears redundant. 34 The Fed found that any adverse systemic risk consideration was more than offset by the benefits of the combination.
The new 10 percent limit leaves no room for discretion. But neither did the previous limit. It remains to be seen whether the new one will be binding. Neither the addition of a new 32 Tarullo, 2011, pp. 5, 6.. 33 The Federal Reserve Board approved the first mentioned acquisition in December 2011, and the second in February, 2012. 34 The Fed considered the systemic risk factor and concluded that it was "consistent with approval." Capital One, Order Approving the Acquisition of a Savings Association and Nonbanking Subsidiaries, Federal Reserve Board Order No. 2012-1, February 14, 2012, pp. 28-40 . Factors reviewed included the existence of substitute providers should Capital One fail, "interconnectedness" that might transmit distress to other institutions or markets, "complexity" that might "hinder timely and efficient resolution," and "cross-border activity" that might complicate coordinating resolution.
13 systemic risk factor nor the 10 percent limit constraint would seem to affect the Fed's autonomy materially.
36
It is worth noting that even if the limit is binding, and even if the systemic risk factor is interpreted restrictively, there is still no assurance that increases in concentration among the largest banking companies will be diminished or even stemmed. Given their likely advantages, including those related to being "too-big-to-fail," there is nothing to prevent them from growing internally.
35
In summary, none of the specific constraints reviewed above can be seen, with a reasonable degree of likelihood, as limiting the Federal Reserve autonomy in a substantial way.
On the other hand, there is no doubt about the extension of Fed authority to nonbanking financial companies, and the expansion of its supervisory powers well beyond traditional measures. 36 An alternative approach would be to combine the aggregate limit with the systemic risk appraisal in merger review by imposing a progressively increasing negative weight for proposed combinations as they approached the limit. 35 Widespread recognition that the new merger provisions are not likely to limit, much less reduce, concentration is implied in recent proposals from well-known financial sector authorities to break-up large, systemically-important banking companies or, at least, to cap their growth. These include some prominent System officials. Governor Tarullo has suggested a limit on financial company size related to Gross Domestic Product (Tarullo, 2012, p. 23-24) . 
